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On Mountains and Molehills: 
 
PROBLEMS, NON-PROBLEMS, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF IDEOLOGY* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
If the theory of ideology is the answer, what is the question? In its slick over-simplification 
and pseudo-profundity, this question-about-a-question brings to mind the well-
rehearsed patter of the doorstep evangelist.  As I’ll argue later, we might do better 
not to ask it at all.  However, much contemporary writing on the topic seems not 
only to assume that there is some determinate question which the theory of ideology 
is designed to address, but also to agree on one answer as to what that question 
might be – namely: Why do the victims of oppression not rise up against their 
oppressors (and sometimes not even seem to show any inclination to do so)?1  The 
particular explanation associated with the theory of ideology invokes ‘ideological 
false consciousness’, which may for present purposes be understood as follows: 
distorted or false ways of representing or relating to the world, where the distortion or falsity 
admits of a ‘functional explanation’2 in terms of its tendency to serve certain social interests – 
such as the interest an oppressor has in continuing to oppress rather than being overthrown.3  
 
In what follows, I’ll use the position taken by Michael Rosen (1996) as a convenient 
case study.  There are two main reasons for this.  The first is that I believe his 
                                                 
* Thanks to: James Angel, Tim Button, Gordon Finlayson, Katharine Jenkins, Basim Musallam; the 
following members of the Cambridger Philosophisches Forschungskolloquium: Fabian Freyenhagen, 
Manuel Dries, Raymond Geuss, Richard Raatzsch, and Jörg Schaub; the Editor, Amy Allen, and two 
anonymous reviewers for Constellations. All provided helpful feedback on earlier versions of this 
paper; none of them is to be held responsible.   
1 See e.g.: Rosen (1996; 2000); Heath (2000).  As Rosen observes, there is a long tradition of interest in 
the perceived problem of why the oppressed appear to accept or acquiesce in their own oppression – 
see e.g. de la Boétie (2008).  This question remains a central one for contemporary theorists of 
oppression (see e.g. Cudd (2005; 2006) or Allen (2008)).   
2 The term ‘functional explanation’ is borrowed from G. A. Cohen (1978). 
3 Even if ‘false consciousness’ is understood to include, as I think it should, problematic omission as 
well as more positive illusion, it may be held that ideology is not just a matter of false consciousness, 
but of certain entrenched practices, dispositions, arrangements or structures (see Cooke (2006; p.18, n.11).  
For convenience, I’ll still phrase things here in terms of ‘false consciousness’, but in doing so I do not 
mean to exclude this idea, which seems to me a sound one, especially in view of the untenability 
(clearly recognised by Marx) of a sharp dividing line between the ‘ideal’ and ‘material’.    
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position to represent a fairly common way of treating the theory of ideology.4  The 
other reason is that, besides identifying the ‘under-mobilization’5 of the oppressed as 
the problem to which the theory of ideology is a response, Rosen’s approach also 
instantiates a further tendency which strikes me as being in need of critique: he goes 
on to make use of ‘rational choice theory’ in order to arrive at an alternative solution 
to the problem – and here, again, he has company.6  Thus, Rosen’s position 
represents two regrettable trends in the literature on ideology.  And these trends are 
connected.  Only by assuming that the point of the theory of ideology is to explain 
why the oppressed do not rise up, is Rosen able then to offer a competing ‘rational 
choice’ ‘solution’ to this problem.  Both stages of his argument seem to me to have 
their roots in a (mistaken) reaction to a concern for a (misconstrued) human 
rationality.   
 
This may all sound rather negative, but from the point of view of someone interested 
in the theory of ideology, mistakes – and, especially, widespread or dominant 
mistakes – are entirely appropriate objects of study.  It is characteristic of this theory, 
though by no means peculiar to it, to think that we can learn something by looking 
at the cases where our thought goes wrong and by asking how this might best be 
explained.  A further ‘reason to be negative’ is best expressed by a line from Novalis 
which Rosen takes as his opening citation: ‘The truthful presentation of error is the 
indirect presentation of truth.’  If that is right, and if I am right to think that a 
common approach to the topic of ideology embodies a fundamental error, then 
perhaps getting clearer on what the error is (and why it occurs) may double as a 
pointer in the direction of something better.   
 
It’s worth giving a quick preview of the structure of this paper now.  I want to argue 
for the following claims: we shouldn’t use a rational choice framework to solve the 
problem of the ‘under-mobilization’ of the oppressed; it doesn’t solve the problem 
                                                 
4 Partly, this may indicate that Rosen himself has had a significant influence, but the important point 
is just that his approach is not an anomaly.   
5 Dowding (2001; p.37). 
6 See, for example, Heath (2000), who adopts a position very similar to Rosen’s in that he construes the 
theory of ideology as a response to the non-resistance of oppressed groups, going on to argue that the 
problem admits of an alternative game-theoretic solution.  Cudd (2005; 2006) also argues for a rational 
choice explanation of oppression (although she does not share Rosen’s and Heath’s explicit 
presentation of this as an alternative to the kind of explanation offered by theories of ideology).  
Dowding (2001) discusses similar approaches to power.  See also Carling (1986) for an overview of the 
use of rational choice theory by Marxist thinkers.  For an example of someone who attempts to apply 
a rational choice approach to more or less everything, see Becker (1974).   
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anyway (at least, the kind of ‘co-ordination problem’ invoked by Rosen cannot solve 
it); it’s not the problem which the theory of ideology is supposed to solve – in fact it 
isn’t really such a problem at all; and anyway, we can solve it (with a bit of help from 
the theory of ideology and a different problem of co-ordination).  Despite 
appearances, these claims can be made to cohere.  In the first part of the paper, I’ll 
consider and criticise the appeal to the ‘co-ordination problem’, before sketching an 
alternative: a more informal ‘problem of co-ordination’.  In Part II, I’ll try to clarify 
the sense in which ‘under-mobilization’ is (and is not) a problem, thereby 
anticipating some objections and misunderstandings, and showing why the 
collection of claims above is not so haphazard or contradictory as it might seem. In 
the third and last section, I say something about why this issue matters: I suggest 
that some of the misrepresentations and mistaken criticisms of the theory of 
ideology charted here may themselves admit of an analysis in terms of the theory of 
ideological false consciousness (that is, they constitute part of an ‘ideology of 
ideology’).  Finally, I suggest that philosophers would do better to take a broader 
view of both the purpose and scope of that theory – which also means taking a good 
look in the mirror.   
 
I. ‘Reich’s Question’ and the problem of co-ordination 
 
For Rosen, the point of the theory of ideology is to give an answer to a question 
which he takes from Wilhelm Reich: 
 
‘What has to be explained is not the fact that the man who is hungry steals or the fact that the 
man who is exploited strikes, but why the majority of those who are hungry don’t steal and 
why the majority of those who are exploited don’t strike.’7 
 
Rosen’s On Voluntary Servitude opens with ‘Reich’s Question’, takes it to be central to 
any theory of ideology, and makes it central, also, to the over-arching argument of 
the book.8  Rosen eventually dismisses the theory of ideology on the basis that it both 
                                                 
7 Reich (1975), p.53.  It’s worth noting that the question that interests Reich is quite different from the 
one that Rosen ascribes to him.  Reich is concerned to account for why populations embrace (or at 
least tolerate) authoritarian regimes such as that of the Nazis, a kind of regime which looks to be in 
important respects novel and unprecedented when it emerges in the early twentieth century, as 
opposed to the more or less universal phenomenon whereby the mass of the population endures a 
social order that goes against its interests.  Furthermore, Reich did not entertain anything 
immediately recognisable as a theory of ideology, in accounting for the acceptance of authoritarianism, 
instead explaining this in terms of a psychoanalytic theory of sexual repression.     
8 The book’s reviewers seem to have been universally impressed by the elegance of this way of 
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fails as and is redundant as a solution to the problem it is meant to solve:9 the theory 
of ideology can’t answer Reich’s Question, but that’s ok – we can answer the 
question without it.10 
 
Of course, there is a sense in which it is no great mystery that many of those who are 
hungry do not steal, nor that the exploited do not strike.  The particular explanation 
will depend on the case, but we will not generally be at a complete loss for things to 
say: perhaps the people concerned are constrained, rightly or wrongly, by certain 
moral convictions; perhaps they lack certain skills or knowledge; perhaps they fear – 
possibly with justification – the long- or short-term personal consequences of 
resistance.  Some of these accounts may be couched in terms of the notion of 
ideology, but others may not.  And as regards the general question of why the 
oppressed do not rise up and overthrow the order that oppresses them, one kind of 
explanation stands out.  This explanation is represented by the so-called ‘co-
ordination problem’11 – an explanation which Rosen himself eventually suggests.  
Co-ordination problems may be constructed in a variety of ways, but it is enough for 
my purposes here to set out Rosen’s characterisation and contrast this with what 
seems to me a more appropriate version.   
 
Rosen depicts the problem as follows.  Step one is to note that what it is rational for 
an agent to do depends on what others can be expected to do.  To borrow Rosen’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
framing the issue, adopting it uncritically and often with evident enthusiasm (Archard (1997), Harkin 
(1997), Herzog (1997)).   
9 I’ll concentrate here on the ‘redundancy’ part of Rosen’s argument, rather than the additional 
arguments he adduces for thinking the theory of ideology positively problematic.  I think that these 
additional arguments also fail, but there is not space to establish that here.   
10 This ‘redundancy argument’ is often supplemented in the literature by further ones: e.g. that it is 
patronising to attribute ‘irrationality’ to people; or that if ideology were really the explanation of non-
resistance, decades of the unmasking and critique of ideological forms of thought would have done 
away with the explanandum by removing the barrier to ‘mobilization’ – see Heath (2000), who uses all 
three arguments.  I’ll touch on the ‘patronising’ worry a little later.  It’s worth noting now, however, 
that this accusation ignores a crucial point about Marx’s view of ideology, namely that there is an 
important sense in which ideological false consciousness is rational (and even ‘true’).  The third 
objection also seems to rest on a misreading of Marx, who scorned the view that emancipation could 
be achieved merely by exposing and correcting illusion: ‘Thus, for instance, after the earthly family is 
discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in 
practice’ (Marx (1967; my emphasis).  It may be that a particular kind of ‘vulgar critical theory’ is 
guilty of a naïve faith in the emancipatory power of critique, but this hardly counts against all forms 
of the theory of ideology.    
11 A better term would be ‘problem of co-ordination’ which, unlike the technical term ‘co-ordination 
problem’, does not commit us to a game-theoretic framework.  Freedom from game-theoretic 
associations  should be regarded as an advantage, for reasons which will become clear.   
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example, a group of hostages may all have an interest in overpowering a gunman, 
but it is only rational for each individual to take part in the attempt at overpowering 
on the expectation that others will do the same; if any individual tries it alone, that 
individual will be shot.  We are to assume not only that all the parties are rational, 
but that they know that the other parties are rational too (Rosen’s acceptance of this 
premise, a characteristic assumption of game theory, will be crucial).  So, an 
individual in this situation knows both that she has a reason to act if others also have 
a reason, and that others do in fact have such a (similarly conditional) reason.  
Therefore, being rational, the parties to this problem will act collectively so as to 
secure the outcome that is in the interests of all.   
 
Thus far, there is no problem.  That comes, says Rosen, when we make a slight 
alteration to this set-up ‘in the direction of reality’.12  It is not generally the case that 
universal co-operation is needed in order to secure some common good.  Very often, 
all that is needed is for enough people to act in a certain way: a ‘critical mass’.  This, 
though, creates the possibility of ‘free riding’: according to Rosen, the rational 
hostage will opt to hang back, because the best option for her is not that in which she 
takes part in a rush on the gunman (an enterprise requiring an investment of energy 
and carrying some risk), but rather the option in which others rush at and overpower 
the gunman, so that she gets the benefit without incurring the cost.  This gives us a 
way of explaining the non-resistance of the oppressed masses without attributing 
irrationality to them, and without appealing to false consciousness: if everyone 
behaves perfectly rationally, there will be no revolution, because everyone will wait 
for everyone else to make it happen; and that secures a sub-optimal outcome for 
everybody.  Thus, on Rosen’s portrayal, a kind of paradox arises whereby people 
collectively act in a way which is highly irrational, as a result of being individually 
too rational (where ‘rationality’ is understood as competence in the exclusive pursuit 
of a narrowly defined self-interest).   
 
This account of the ‘co-ordination problem’13 is typical in supposing that the 
individuals involved are fully rational and informed about the relevant features of 
                                                 
12 Rosen (1996), p.261. 
13 It is worth noting (although it doesn’t matter much) that what Rosen calls a ‘co-ordination problem’ 
isn’t really one in the strict sense of the term.  In a co-ordination problem, the outcome that is optimal 
for each individual is the same.  This is not the case where there is a possibility of free riding, since for 
each individual, the best outcome is one in which she gets the benefit whilst others bear the burden – 
and that, ex hypothesi, is not the best outcome for the burden-bearers.    
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their situation (including the full rationality of the other parties),14 and then asking 
how such agents can be expected to behave.  The point of this, one would hope, is 
not to suggest that individuals actually are perfectly rational, but to avoid having to 
invoke irrationality in order to explain non-resistance.  We are all irrational to some 
extent or other, at least some of the time.  But if the consistent failure of the 
oppressed to resist their oppression had to be explained in terms of their behaving 
irrationally – the thought may be – that would commit us to too damning a verdict 
about the rationality of the bulk of the population who suffer oppression at the 
hands of the remainder.   
 
There is a serious question to be asked, however, as to whether anything useful can 
be shown through thought experiments about what perfectly rational agents would 
do in extremely artificial situations – whether the situation of ‘perfect information’ 
often presupposed in monetarist economics, or that of being behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’ (a staple of Rawlsian political philosophy).15  What does it tell us if 
perfectly rational agents would not rise up? It tells us something about what 
perfectly rational agents would do.  We, however, are not perfectly rational, and it 
may well be the case that the failure of actual oppressed people to rise up is partly 
explained by their (human) irrationality, regardless of what our imaginary perfectly 
rational agents would do.  The point that the co-ordination problem is being used to 
make, I’ve acknowledged, is just that we don’t strictly need to explain non-resistance 
in terms of irrationality.16  But so what? We knew that already.  We could explain it, 
for example, in terms of imperfections in people’s information (about the causes of 
their suffering, about each other’s situations and attitudes, about the likely 
consequences of rising up, about how overthrowing the existing order is to be 
approached).  For that matter, we could explain it by magic beans.  The more 
interesting question is not that of what explanations are possible, but the question of 
which explanations are remotely plausible. 
 
On top of these basic methodological objections to Rosen’s use of the ‘co-ordination 
problem’, it seems to me that he gets things wrong even on his own terms.  The idea 
that rational agents would try to free ride is not without intuitive resonance, and it is 
                                                 
14 See Davis (1977). 
15 Rawls (2005) imagines that the parties in his ‘Original Position’ lack knowledge of such matters as 
their sex, race, talents, and position in society (though also – incredibly – that they have access to the 
‘basic facts’ of economics and sociology).   
16 A distinction between different senses in which something might be explanatorily ‘necessary’ will 
be important later on.   
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in line with the account which ‘causal’ decision theorists such as David Lewis give 
for the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’.17  Lewis points out that the prisoner is better off 
‘ratting’ on his partner, whatever the partner does: if the partner rats, then not ratting 
will mean winning nothing, whereas ratting will bring $1000; if the partner does not 
rat, the ratting strategy will bring $1,001,000, whereas not ratting will bring 
$1,000,000.18  Similarly, the oppressed agent may reason as follows: either there will 
be a critical mass of up-risers, or there won’t; if there is, then I am better off free 
riding than joining in; and if there isn’t, once again I am better off not bearing the 
costs of taking part in a failed uprising.   
 
This account of things starts to fall apart, however, when we recall the premise 
shared by both Rosen and Lewis: that the parties know that the other parties are, like 
them, rational.  Lewis is strictly correct to say that the prisoner is better off ratting 
whether his partner rats or not.  But this way of putting it is highly misleading, because 
it allows into consideration two scenarios which should be ruled out: one in which 
the first prisoner rats and the partner does not; and one where the partner rats and 
the first prisoner does not.  These simply cannot arise if both prisoners are rational 
and relevantly identical in their situations, and given that the prisoners know that 
this condition is satisfied, they must know that these two scenarios are out.  In that 
case, the choice is between the two remaining scenarios: both rat, and each gets 
$1000; or, neither rats, and each gets $1,000,000.  Not a difficult choice for the rational 
prisoner.19  
 
In much the same way, Rosen’s claim that it is individually rational to free ride relies 
on something that was meant to be excluded by the set-up of the problem.  If the 
parties really are alike in being rational and in knowing each other to be rational, 
then each individual will reason that their choice is between only two options: an 
uprising in which all participate; or universal inaction and the preservation of the 
status quo.  The first, we are assuming, is superior and so will be selected: the 
oppressed will rise up.  What Rosen wants us to imagine, by contrast, is something 
more like the traditional story of the three robbers, each thinking (falsely) that he is 
                                                 
17 There are numerous variants of the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’, but for present purposes it is a thought 
experiment with the following features: two prisoners, who have committed a crime together, are 
locked in separate cells with no possibility of communication; they are offered the choice of (i) 
confessing, and turning the other prisoner in as well (‘ratting’), or (ii) staying quiet; and they know 
the various pay-offs which attach to eat outcome (e.g. prisoner 1 rats, prisoner 2 stays silent); the 
game is to work out what the rational prisoner will do.   
18 Lewis (1986).   
19 Davis (1977) seems to advance basically the same argument. 
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outwitting the others by not putting his ration of food into their communal stew, 
with an empty pot as their reward.   
 
One might suggest, on Rosen’s behalf, that we make a crucial departure from the 
classic set-up of the co-ordination problem and stipulate that, whilst each agent is 
perfectly rational, she does not know that others are also perfectly rational.  In that 
case, it would be correct to say that rational agents would not rise up: each is better 
off staying out of it, regardless of what others do – and what others will do is, for 
each deliberating agent, an unknown quantity.20   
 
Now, we can do that if we wish, but it is not clear how much it achieves.  We still 
have to face the more fundamental methodological worries already mentioned.  So 
what, if such agents would not rise up? It shows that non-resistance might be 
explained without recourse to ascriptions of irrationality (but not that the 
explanation is correct or plausible).  Not only is that a pretty meagre win, but with 
the appeal to this version of the co-ordination problem, we have ended up having to 
ascribe a particular kind of ignorance (rather than irrationality) to the agents.  It’s not 
at all clear that, from the point of view of someone who finds ascriptions of 
irrationality problematic in the first place, ascribing ignorance is any better: instead 
of an image of the masses as wild or stupid, we seem to have a diagnosis of the non-
resistance of the oppressed as one big, tragic misunderstanding.  This defeats the 
already dubious object of the exercise.  How does it in any way defend the 
credentials of the real-life oppressed to point out that imaginary ignorant egotists 
wouldn’t overthrow their oppressors either? 
 
Consideration of this possible counter-move also raises a point of more general 
importance: that we have a choice as to the way in which we set up a problem of co-
ordination.  We have a choice, for that matter, as to whether we use this device at all 
– and we must at the very least have something to say in justification of our chosen 
approach.  There is no pre-given and fixed ‘Co-ordination Problem’, which somehow 
presses itself upon us.  On the contrary, it is game of our own construction, which 
we can choose to play or not to play (for various reasons), and which can be played 
in various different ways (again, for various reasons).  So we are always entitled to 
ask why we should invoke the co-ordination problem, or a given form of it; and the 
                                                 
20 Another way of putting this is to note that Rosen has to give up the idea that the parties have 
knowledge of each other’s rationality, in order to make the adjustment ‘in the direction of reality’ 
from a universal compliance scenario to a critical mass version. 
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justification had better not be merely that this gives us the result we antecedently 
wanted.   
 
*** 
 
What, then, might a better explanation of the non-resistance of oppressed 
populations look like? If the formal ‘co-ordination problem’ is a non-starter, that 
doesn’t mean that nothing even faintly resembling this answer could be any good.  
We might still refer to a more informal ‘problem of co-ordination’, i.e. to the generic 
difficulty human beings often experience in the attempt to co-ordinate their actions 
into mutually beneficial arrangements.  Indeed, it would be pretty bizarre not to 
think that this sort of problem is both real and relevant to the failure of oppressed 
groups to overthrow their oppressors.   
 
Unlike the ‘co-ordination problem’ of rational choice theory, a more relevant 
problem of co-ordination must be one which makes room for the reality of human 
beings as imperfectly rational, imperfectly informed and somewhat confused, often 
fearful, subject to more or less reasonable forms of hope, prone to a condition 
sometimes termed ‘learned helplessness’,21 motivated to a considerable extent to 
pursue what we would think of as their own interests, but also motivated in ways 
that cannot plausibly be reduced to this – e.g. by aesthetic, altruistic, experimental, 
or self-destructive urges.   
 
Is it a mystery that such beings, having been born into a social order that oppresses 
them, often do not rise up and overthrow it? Not really, and partly for reasons that 
invoke what looks very much like a problem of co-ordination: we have a situation 
where our interests coincide (we all have an interest in overthrowing the oppressive 
order); our actions need to be co-ordinated in a certain way in order to get the 
desired outcome (enough of us have to act at the same time – and, in practice, we 
also have to act in organised, mutually supportive and co-operative ways); yet when 
we act on the reasons that seem to apply to us as individuals, this outcome is 
undermined rather than secured, so that there is an apparent mismatch between 
individual and collective rationality.  It’s not difficult to come up with real examples 
of such situations.  Everyday life is riddled with cases of hesitation, uncertainty and 
more or less tragic (or comic, or tragi-comic) misunderstanding.  Seb and Christina 
have one (indivisible) biscuit, but are both too polite to take it; both would consider 
                                                 
21 Seligman (1975).  
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the best outcome of all to be having the biscuit, the second best to be that in which 
the other has the biscuit, and worst of all to be the outcome in which the biscuit 
eventually goes stale, or is stolen by a less inhibited passer-by; each tries to persuade 
the other to have it, vaguely hoping that the other will be the most insistent; and the 
stand-off is eventually brought to an end by the appropriation of the biscuit by Rob. 
Two or more parties have an interest in some mutually beneficial scheme – contract, 
lunch, orgy, or whatever – but are mistaken about each other’s desires (perhaps they 
have good grounds for their mistaken impressions); under these circumstances, it 
may make sense for the parties not to approach each other, thinking their chances 
too poor to warrant the pain, humiliation or other costs of failure; so nobody acts, 
and everyone loses out.   
 
There are two basic conditions that make such cases possible: (i) the fact that what 
attitudes we have, and how we are motivated to behave, depends in part on what we 
take others’ attitudes to be, and on how we anticipate that they will behave; and (ii) 
the fact that we do not always know what others’ attitudes are, and how they are going 
to behave.  These conditions seem to be very ordinary and pervasive facts of life.   
 
What, though, is the particular sort of co-ordination problem which applies to the 
situation of the oppressed? Well, obviously enough, this will depend on which 
‘oppressed’ we’re talking about – on the historical and social context to which they 
belong, on the various psychological and cultural characteristics possessed by this 
set of people as a whole, or by sub-groups or individuals within it.  But here are 
some things that we can plausibly say.  First, we are talking here about large 
numbers of people, who do not have direct access to one another’s mental states or 
intentions, and whose communication with one another is imperfect for various 
straightforward reasons, e.g. constraints set by geography, time, the state of 
technology, etc.  In addition to that, and as Marx points out, those who own the 
means of material production are also the owners and controllers of the ‘means of 
mental production’,22 and so it is not surprising to find (in contemporary Western 
societies, at least) a mass media which tends to emphasise apathy and conservatism 
in the population, and to play down any signs of radical political dissatisfaction or 
translate it into more manageable and convenient forms – hence, for example, the 
frequency of references to ‘greed’ or the ‘politics of envy’.  So, oppressed individuals 
would quite likely not be fully aware of the willingness of sufficient numbers to 
                                                 
22 Marx & Engels (1970), p.64 [emphasis mine].    
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engage in resistance, even if this willingness were to exist on a large enough scale 
and in a conscious and articulate form.   
 
A second consideration is that, in real life, it never happens that very large numbers 
of people do anything at all (apart from, maybe, breathe) at precisely the same moment.  
There must always, therefore, be a first few, and those few are likely to pay a heavy 
price.  The reason why it makes sense for Rosen to describe those initial acts of 
resistance as ‘non-rational’, after all, is that they are often pretty much suicidal – acts 
of enormous self-sacrifice or personal risk.  This is important in countering the 
impression that the non-resistance of the oppressed is due to a problem that arises 
from the tendency toward ‘free riding’.  There is a big difference between wanting to 
have all the goodies without taking your share of the burden and risk – in Rosen’s 
example, the risk shared when hostages rush at an armed kidnapper en masse – and, 
on the other hand, merely stopping short of martyrdom (whether in the form of 
death or imprisonment, destitution, or more mildly and mundanely, a life of early 
morning paper sales, endless demonstrations and campaigns and interminable 
meetings).  Such things might not be so bad if they could be expected to take on the 
‘snowball structure’ that Rosen describes as characterising successful resistance 
movements.  But what we are more likely to encounter, of course, is what we might 
call the ‘Whac-A-Mole’ structure: a small number attempt to initiate some resistance, 
but run out of steam, or are put down by riot police, and the whole process has to 
begin again – further discouraged by people’s first- and second-hand experience of 
failure and defeat.  But why is that? – Rosen-in-Reich’s-name might ask – Why do 
attempts at resistance tend to be so abortive? Well, partly it is due to the point already 
noted, about the absence of perfect synchronicity in human action and of perfect 
immediacy in human communication and response.  But it is more than just a case of 
tragic misunderstanding or delayed reactions, and this brings me to a third point.  In 
order for their resistance to be successful, the actions of the oppressed need to be co-
ordinated not only in the sense of happening at roughly the same time, but in some 
further sense of being organised in some minimally mutually supportive way.   
 
This last point shouldn’t be overstated.  It may be that the moment of revolutionary 
overthrow itself is always fairly chaotic, but the need for organisation is clearly there 
at other stages of the process of resistance – especially, perhaps, those immediately 
preceding and immediately following this ‘revolutionary moment’.  In order to make 
Rosen’s example of the hostages do justice to this, we might imagine not that the 
hostages simply have to rush at the gunman at the same moment, but instead that 
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they have to form a human pyramid – perhaps to reach a button on the ceiling, 
which, when pressed, would administer a fatal electric shock to their captor.  The 
captor, of course, has (a) a very good reason not to let this happen, and (b) a gun.   
 
Whilst consciously ridiculous, this example is actually quite instructive, as it 
displays very clearly the crucial disconnect between collective and individual 
rationality.  What is needed is for A to crouch here, B to crouch there, C to stand on 
A’s right shoulder and B’s left one, and so on and so forth.  This formation – which 
may be instantiated in numerous possible ways – is what is in everybody’s interests.  
But what is the sensible thing to do, from the point of view of an individual hostage? 
Someone could, from an external point of view, translate the claim that the hostages 
collectively should form a human pyramid into the claims that (i) A ‘should’ move 
like this, and (ii) B ‘should’ move like that, and (iii) C ‘should’ position himself in a 
further way – etc., etc. – where all these ‘shoulds’ are conditional on the fulfilment of 
all the others.  But these are not ‘shoulds’ that the hostages are in a position to act on, 
and it makes perfect sense, from their individual points of view, to sit tight so as not 
to get shot.   
 
So, one level of the problem is just the imperfect knowledge already cited as a factor 
in problems of co-ordination: there are certain facts which may obtain, but which the 
parties do not know obtain – e.g. the fact that there enough people who are inclined-
to-overthrow-the-oppressor-so-long-as-a-sufficient-number-are-so-inclined as to make it 
the case that they are actually capable of overthrowing the oppressor.  But another 
level of the problem is not that the oppressed parties lack a certain assurance of pre-
existing truths (so that we can say, ‘If only they knew…’ or, ‘If only they had realised 
in time…’), but rather, that they lack an assurance of a kind that would come from 
their being able to make certain things true – in particular, from certain explicit or 
tacit arrangements being made amongst the parties.  The reason for emphasising this 
point is that it provides some defence against the charge of condescension that is 
often levelled at any view which invokes irrationality, illusion, or ignorance.  The 
absence of the kind of knowledge and assurance just distinguished means that, 
insofar as the oppressed do know what other people are going to do, what they 
know – or at least, what they have good reason to expect – is that the actions of 
others will not be co-ordinated in such a way as to make for a successful collective 
resistance.  It is to be expected that, like the hostages in my version of the example, 
they will stay put, often for quite respectable reasons.    
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II. Problems and non-problems 
 
If all this seems obvious, that is part of the point.   
 
Question: Why do the oppressed not resist their oppression?  
 
Answer: Some do, of course, but it is often made difficult (bordering on impossible) by 
numerous factors, such as: individuals’ limited knowledge of each other’s dispositions; the 
lack of underlying arrangements between individuals which might allow them act as a 
collective, knowing their actions to be co-ordinated with one another in a productive way; the 
considerable costs attached to the attempt to promote this sort of co-ordination, costs which 
will be especially high for those who are prepared to make the first move, and which are not 
compensated for by any significant degree of justified confidence in being able to secure the 
desired end, even for future generations.   
 
Anyone who has ever even seriously considered being part of some political struggle 
will be perfectly familiar with these sorts of obstacles. 
  
So, I’m claiming, there is an important sense in which the problem of ‘under-
mobilization’ is not a problem at all.  The fact that the majority of the hungry don’t 
steal and the majority of the exploited don’t strike is not obviously more mysterious 
than the fact that, sometimes, they do.  ‘Reich’s Question’ merely places one 
mundane phenomenon alongside another.  Compare: ‘What has to be explained is 
not why people eat food, but why the majority of those who eat food first buy that 
food in shops’; or, ‘What has to be explained is not why people use their keys to 
unlock doors, but why sometimes they use their keys to make a jangly noise, or why 
they often lose their keys and have to go searching for them…’   
 
Philosophers often pride themselves on taking what we would think was something 
unproblematic and simple, and showing that it is actually complicated and fraught 
with various difficulties, and that we don’t understand it as well as we thought we 
did.  How do I know that there is a table in front of me? And is it really a table, or a 
collection of particles, arranged table-wise? For any of our notions, it is possible to 
ask questions up to a point where we become confused or unsure.  We could always 
meet any proffered answer to ‘Reich’s Question’ by dragging it into a ‘why’-regress, 
for example.  There are certainly instances where it is laudable to make manifest the 
difficulty and complication in things we would otherwise tend to take for granted.  
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But philosophers had better not believe that they can apply this technique to all 
objects.  They can’t, for two good reasons: first because they are finite beings, and 
second, because in problematising one thing we will always have to assume other 
things and hold those things fixed.  We must therefore be constantly making 
decisions about what to problematise and what to leave alone, decisions which can 
(and frequently do) go wrong in two main ways: we can leave things 
unproblematised which we ought to problematise, or we can problematise things 
that we would do better to let pass.  It is not always easy to avoid these mistakes, or 
to judge whether and when they are being made.  But it should be noted that there is 
a particular phenomenon in political philosophy, where some of these ‘mistakes’ are 
not simply mistakes, but rather, they are devices potentially admitting of ideological 
explanation.  We find that certain concepts, like ‘justice’, ‘equality’, ‘rights’, are 
frequently treated as if these were straightforward and obvious, as if we all knew 
what they meant (or at least that, whatever exactly they mean, it must be something 
good and important).  They are ushered in like old friends, whilst other concepts – in 
particular, any associated with Marx or Marxism – are stopped at the door and 
subjected to a strip search.  Perhaps Rosen profits from the image of the philosopher 
as shining an unforgiving light on what others are prepared to pass over, but his 
decision as to where to direct the beam may be seen as conforming to this general 
pattern, a pattern which – although Rosen, of course, could not accept something of 
this form – seems apt for an explanation in terms of its friendliness to the 
philosophical and political status quo.   
 
Rosen, in any case, does not suggest that the non-resistance of the oppressed is even 
superficially unproblematic, but seems to regard it as mysterious in a sense which 
goes well beyond the philosopher’s high-minded sense (in which everything is 
mysterious).  The assumption underlying this, I take it, is that people generally do 
what it is in their interests to do, when they can.  So when they don’t, we are owed 
an explanation.  That may be fair enough, for an appropriate sense of ‘can’.  Such a 
‘can’ would not allow us to say that the hostages ‘can’ electrocute the gunman (by a 
pulling off a lightning-fast, spontaneous human pyramid trick).  There is no mystery 
as to why we don’t do things like that – things which we ‘can’ do in a much thinner 
sense – even if those things would promote our interests.  To suggest that ‘Reich’s 
Question’ constitutes a puzzle because, in the normal run of things, people promote 
their interests ‘when they can’, is a bit like saying that objects have a tendency to fall 
to the ground, and so it is mysterious that everything is not lying on the floor.  
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Unsupported objects fall to the ground, sure.  That does not make it surprising to 
discover that many objects sit on tables, or hang on pieces of string.   
 
This should, I hope, help to pre-empt one kind of objection, which persistently re-
asserts the intuitive mysteriousness of ‘non-mobilization’.  The key here is to 
distinguish between different types or levels of ‘problem’.  To call something a 
‘problem’ or ‘mystery’ is, of course, to say something about (a) our own purposes or 
goals, and (b) our current levels of competence or comprehension.  In the intellectual 
sense, something is a ‘problem’ if we don’t understand it as much as we want or 
need to.  With ‘problems’ in a very strong sense, we just have no idea what to say.  
Crop circles, perhaps, are a problem of this kind.  Then, just as there are said to be 
children whom only a mother could love, there are problems only a philosopher 
could worry about – like the ‘concept horse problem’, or whether we should be 
‘blobjectivists’ or not.  The non-resistance of the oppressed clearly does not belong to 
either of these categories, but may be said to be a problem in the relatively weak 
sense that there are various competing explanations, where it is not obvious exactly 
which explanation is the right one.  A vast number of phenomena – including pretty 
much everything that scientists and historians argue about – are ‘problems’ in this 
sense (which clearly falls short of ‘mystery’).   
 
Now, the non-resistance of the oppressed is arguably problematic in a rather 
stronger sense, as noted above, if it violates a general expectation that people will act 
in accordance with their own interests, where they can.  However, my suggestion 
was that once we specify this ‘where they can’ caveat more fully, it will turn out that, 
more often than is usually recognised, they can’t.  There may still be a significant 
remainder, perhaps: an element of a truer ‘voluntary servitude’, where people act 
against their own interests even though they could act in a way that serves them.  At 
this point, I’d suggest, the notion of ideological false consciousness is one good 
candidate for taking up the slack.  With that, however, I come to the second point at 
which it may be necessary to clarify my position and to defend it against foreseeable 
complaint.  I said at the outset that I would take issue with the view that the purpose 
of the theory of ideology is to explain the non-resistance of the oppressed, and I have 
been arguing that an informal problem of co-ordination can help to account for this 
non-resistance.  And yet, now, I seem to be saying that the theory of ideology does 
form at least part of the explanation of why the oppressed do not rise up.  So the 
theory of ideology is needed in order to answer ‘Reich’s Question’ after all! And is 
this not then also, at least to a considerable extent, the point of the theory? For if it 
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turned out that ideology wasn’t needed at all, in order to answer ‘Reich’s Question’, 
wouldn’t that be a major blow for the theory – something which would seriously 
weaken its appeal and undermine its motivation?23 
 
The response to this hinges on the sense of ‘need’ at work when it is asked, ‘Do we 
need the theory of ideology in order to answer “Reich’s Question”?’ – and the 
distinction I’ll make between different senses of ‘need’ runs parallel to the distinction 
used in my reply to the first anticipated objection, between different senses of 
‘problem’.  The answer, then, is ‘yes and no’.  We don’t need the theory of ideology, 
in the sense that we can say plenty in reply to ‘Reich’s Question’ before even 
mentioning it.  In another sense, however, we do need the theory of ideology, if some 
form of that theory is true (and I believe it is): we need it in the sense that a full and 
correct answer to ‘Reich’s Question’ would then be bound to invoke ideology at some 
point.  And that means that it would indeed be bad news for the theory, if it turned 
out to be completely redundant for answering that question, since it would then be 
badly shaken by a kind of (weak) modus tollens argument (i.e. If T is true, then ideology 
will figure in the answer to ‘Reich’s Question’; ideology doesn’t figure in the answer to 
‘Reich’s Question’; so, T is not true).24  There is a world of difference, however, between 
being merely an implication of a theory and being its raison d’être.  That the theory of 
ideology can help to answer ‘Reich’s Question’, I am suggesting, stands to that 
theory as an instance of the former rather than the latter.   
 
To deny that the point of the theory of ideology is to answer ‘Reich’s Question’ (or 
something similar) is ambiguous, however.  It could be read as a psychological 
claim, about the intentions of the proponents of the theory of ideology.  For some – 
although perhaps more often for its critics than for its advocates – this has indeed 
been the point of the theory of ideology.  I was at pains, after all, to emphasise that 
Rosen’s position is not anomalous.  But when one commentator states, in the manner 
of the most uncontroversial commonplace, that this is what the theory meant for 
Marx and his followers,25 this seems to me badly mistaken: there is no indication that 
Marx was ever particularly puzzled by the non-resistance of the oppressed, and in 
any case he figured that this was a state of affairs which was very soon to change.  
                                                 
23 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for Constellations for raising the objection in this form.   
24 I describe this as a ‘weak’ modus tollens because it’s not clear to me that the consequent strictly 
follows from the antecedent – nor is the antecedent at all clear.  It is more a case of: if anything 
recognisable as the theory of ideology is true, then it’s very hard to see how ideology could fail to figure in the 
answer to ‘Reich’s Question’. 
25 Heath (2000; p.363). 
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The claim is significantly more understandable if applied to twentieth-century 
Marxists or ‘critical theorists’, many of whom have been preoccupied with the 
question of the non-appearance of proletarian revolution.  But their stance is 
importantly different from the one embodied by Rosen and others, which is the one I 
have been considering.  First, there is an enormous difference between being puzzled 
by the failure of a particular group (the proletariat) to overthrow another particular 
group (the bourgeoisie) at a particular time (e.g. the early twentieth century), on the 
grounds that this seems to defy the predictions we had made on the back of a particular theory 
of history, and, on the other hand, being puzzled by the non-resistance of oppressed 
groups per se as a timeless problem which stands independently of a prior 
commitment to any particular theory of history and society.26  Second, it’s not clear 
that the point of the theory of ideology, for this sort of Marxist or critical theorist, 
could be identified as the task of solving even this (different) problem, since the 
notion of ideology is already a component of the Marxist theory which gives rise to 
the difficulty by making (or seeming to make) an unfulfilled prediction.  It is not 
something which is tacked on later, in order to get the theory out of trouble.  Rather, 
it is an integral part of the original theory of history and society, and it’s reasonable 
to infer that this is because people have thought that there was some independent 
point or value to the notion.   
 
In sum, it’s not at all clear that Marxist theorists’ interest in the theory of ideology 
has in fact been motivated by a drive to answer ‘Reich’s Question’; it’s still less clear 
that it would make sense for them to conceive of their project in that way; and there 
is no reason to think that this is how Marx himself conceived of his project.  As well 
as a psychological claim, there might then be a more ‘normative’ or ‘imperative’ one: 
whatever people have, as a matter of fact, taken the point of the theory of ideology to 
be, they shouldn’t take that point to be (exclusively, or even mainly) answering 
‘Reich’s Question’.  This is a claim about what the theory of ideology is good for.  In 
the next and final section, I’ll try to say something about the respective pointfulness 
of the theory of ideology and also of my own arguments in this paper.   
 
III. Concluding thoughts: What is the point?  
 
                                                 
26 The thinkers I have mostly addressed in this paper are motivated by the second sort of puzzlement 
– e.g. de la Boétie, Heath, Rosen, or Cudd.  This is not to say that there is automatically something 
wrong with this sort of puzzlement – philosophers have legitimately been puzzled by far less – so 
long as we are careful about the sense in which non-resistance is held to be a ‘problem’ (cf. my 
distinctions above).   
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In complaining that Rosen – in his emphasis on ‘Reich’s Question’, and eventual 
invocation of some sort of problem of co-ordination as a solution – makes a 
mountain out of a molehill and crowns it with a platitude, I might be accused of 
expressing mere irritability rather than any substantial disagreement.  Setting aside 
my criticisms of his particular use of the ‘co-ordination problem’, if my point is just 
that ‘Reich’s Question’ is not so hard to answer, and that a sizeable part of the 
answer is provided by the idea of a problem of co-ordination (something to which 
Rosen himself is committed, even if his version of the problem is the wrong one), 
then isn’t the difference between our positions mainly that Rosen has a higher 
estimation of the initial difficulty of the task (and thus a higher estimation of his own 
achievement)? 
 
No, I want to say next.  The disagreement matters.  It matters, first, because the kind 
of approach exemplified by Rosen encourages us to let go of the theory of ideology 
prematurely.  And it matters, furthermore, because the kind of approach I’m 
opposing has (at least) three functions that are not only dubious, but seem 
themselves to be crying out for an ideological analysis.   
 
In the first place, construing the theory of ideology as an answer to ‘Reich’s 
Question’ has the effect of playing into a view of human beings which artificially 
elevates a particular notion of rationality.  It elevates this rationality both 
descriptively – by implying that humans are closer to the economist’s rational 
calculator than is plausibly the case – and normatively, through the underlying 
suggestion that the worst thing we can accuse someone of is imperfect rationality.  
Once we see the use of a particular form of the co-ordination problem as a choice 
standing in need of justification, this opens the possibility that some uses of the ‘co-
ordination problem’ (and the motivations behind those uses) might themselves 
admit of analysis in terms of ideology.  Rosen’s own (fairly standard) approach, for 
example – by couching the problem in terms of the behaviour of perfectly ‘rational’ 
agents, and by doing this in the service of an attempt to make room for the 
‘rationality’ of the oppressed – gives sustenance to the neo-liberal ideal of human 
beings as rational-by-default. The ‘normal’, mature human being, in his27 ‘normal’ 
state, is a ‘rational animal’: this is central to what it means to be ‘human’.  Our most 
important obligation to fellow human beings is therefore to respect their ‘rationality’.  
This, in its turn, is taken to be a matter of treating ‘revealed preferences’ uncritically, 
on the assumption that these track people’s interests and also justify the states of 
                                                 
27 Yes, ‘his’. 
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affairs they tend (individually and in combination) to produce.  Something similar 
may be said for Rosen’s suggestion that the co-ordination problem arises from the 
drive towards ‘free riding’.  The political connotations couldn’t really be a lot worse 
here.  On the one hand, there is a view of human beings as fundamentally greedy 
and selfish (perhaps lazy or cowardly, too).  This is, of course, the basis of an 
extremely popular and convenient argument for why capitalism, inequality and 
hierarchy are ‘natural’, unavoidable facts of life.   
 
In both cases, Rosen might well remind us that the agents in the co-ordination 
problem are not supposed to be accurate depictions of real human beings: he is not 
saying either that human beings are or should be like that.  But unless we suppose 
real-life agents to resemble the hypothetical ones to a considerable extent, it seems 
that the thought experiment cannot do what it is meant to do: we still have to explain 
why actual agents, if they are not at all like that, do not rise up against their 
oppressors; and so we are back where we started.  My claim is not that Rosen 
explicitly or consciously endorses a view of human beings as hyper-rational (in a 
narrow economistic sense of ‘rationality’),28 or as shameless free riders.  It is more 
that (i) his approach would make a good deal of sense on the back of such a view 
(and not otherwise), and (ii) that it’s plausible to see the sort of approach he takes as 
being causally connected – in terms of its likely origin, and in terms of its likely 
reinforcing function – with the view of human ‘rationality’ just described, and with 
the political interests associated with it.29  And if the appearance and use of this form 
of the co-ordination problem in books such as Rosen’s have this sort of function, 
then this provides a tempting explanation of why this form of the co-ordination 
problem should appear and be used in this way when, after all, it doesn’t otherwise 
seem to make any sense.   
 
Secondly, Rosen’s emphasis on ‘Reich’s Question’ conforms to an unwelcome 
tendency in thinking about ideology: a tendency to regard the ideological distortion 
of thought as primarily a disease of the poor, unfortunate or downtrodden.  Note 
that my objection here is not the familiar one which regards as ‘patronising’ the 
                                                 
28 This would be especially odd, given that parts of On Voluntary Servitude are devoted to the criticism 
of Western ‘rationalism’.  Rosen also suggests (p.262) that resistance movements always get going 
through initial non-rational acts by small numbers of people who are prepared to resist even without 
any reasonable expectation of success. 
29 An instructive comparison here is the ‘propaganda model’ of the mass media outlined by Chomsky 
& Herman (1994): the ways in which atrocities are reported is clearly traced to the end of protecting or 
advancing certain (US) interests, but without any suggestion that this is the result of a conscious 
conspiracy, or of deliberate whitewash on the part of individual journalists.   
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ascription of ideological false consciousness to the oppressed.  What is too seldom on 
the minds of those who make this objection is that ideological false consciousness 
might equally well be ascribed to people other than the oppressed, and my point is 
that this is clearly an oversight.  It is also very un-Marxist, should we care about that.  
Marx clearly regarded not only the views and values of the proletariat, but also the 
‘higher’ spheres of culture and thought as having their form shaped by the demands 
of the material ‘base’ of society, and he explicitly diagnosed and criticised much of 
the philosophy of his day as bourgeois ideology.  When he remarks that ‘the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world’,30 or when he calls Bentham ‘that 
insipid, pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the ordinary bourgeois intelligence of 
the 19th century’,31 he is not exactly talking about poor benighted factory workers 
who do not notice their chains.  Marx – correctly, it seems to me – saw the 
ideological distortion of thought as something applying across social classes and 
milieus, though no doubt taking different forms in these different contexts.  It is not 
at all clear that he sees the ideological distortion of consciousness as a phenomenon 
whose occurrence or importance is concentrated within the ranks of the oppressed.  
But the tendency among contemporary commentators on Marx is to look at ideology 
in much the same way as the different phenomenon of alienation is seen, i.e. as 
something which, although it affects everyone, affects the working class more (and in 
an especially significant way).  That verdict, which seems to me basically correct 
when applied to alienation, becomes inappropriate when glibly transferred to the 
issue of ideology.  For instance, Jonathan Wolff, in his very popular introduction to 
Marx’s thought, touches on the issue of ideology only a couple of times; but when he 
does, the impression given is that this is very much a lower-class problem.  The 
examples he uses to introduce the idea are the ‘taboos’ against theft and 
unemployment,32 later adding that: ‘[t]he existence of religion in class-divided 
societies is very useful in keeping the workers in check.  Distracted by thoughts of 
heaven, they are less likely to protest about hell on earth… While we might note that 
this portrayal of the workers as unwitting dupes of a bourgeois conspiracy is hardly 
edifying, it could be true.’33  Leaving aside Wolff’s commission of one of the most 
clichéd blunders in Marx interpretation – one which Rosen commits at one point as 
well, when he presents Marx as portraying the proletariat simply as ‘passive victims’ 
and ‘obedient chicks’34 – the point of present interest is that he automatically selects 
                                                 
30 This is the 11th Thesis on Feuerbach (see Marx (1967)). 
31 Marx (1990), Chapter 24, Section 5. 
32 Wolff (2003), p.60.   
33 ibid, pp.103-4.   
34 Rosen (1996), p.182.   
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these examples, rather than any of the contemporary philosophers, theologians, or 
economists whose thought Marx criticised as being ideological.  Jon Elster’s 
treatment of the subject of ideology in his own introduction to Marx is similar, 
asking how it is that ‘the interest of the ruling class is supposed to shape the views of 
the other members of society [my emphasis].  The view that rulers and exploiters 
shape the world view of the oppressed by conscious, cynical manipulation is too 
simplistic.’35  So it is (not so much too simplistic as plain wrong, in fact, whether as an 
interpretation of Marx or as a description of reality); both Elster and Wolff are, to my 
mind, guilty of having too much truck with it.  But again, the present point is that 
Elster conforms to the pattern of focusing on ideological false consciousness as 
something which affects the minds of the masses so as to keep them in their place: a 
distortion of the thought of the people, by the ruling class, for the ruling class.   
 
I’m not suggesting for a moment that Rosen (or Elster, or Wolff) actually says – or 
even thinks – that oppressed groups are the only ones to suffer from ideological 
illusion (although it does not seem so unreasonable to infer that the oppressed are 
assumed to be worse afflicted).  But we can distinguish once again between what 
people believe or are strictly committed to, and what functional role may plausibly be 
attributed to their choice of emphasis, what sentiments and impressions may lie 
behind this or be reinforced by it.  The latter set of considerations, as well as the 
former, must inform the way in which we interpret and evaluate people’s statements 
– predictable invocations of the ‘genetic fallacy’ (or to the absurdity of holding 
intellectuals responsible for all causal consequences of their interventions) 
notwithstanding.  A particularly clear illustration of this is the focus of so-called 
‘New Atheists’ on the evils of Islam: whilst many would claim that they are even-
handedly critical of all religions – interested only in the distinction between more or 
less ‘fundamentalist’ versions of a given creed – the frequency of the selection of 
Islam, rather than e.g. Christianity or Judaism, as the target of anti-religious vitriol 
cannot be separated from a political climate marked by rising Islamophobia and the 
Western aggression against predominantly Muslim nations, of which Islamophobic 
sentiment is both a product and a cause.36 
 
To think of ideology as being exclusively or chiefly about the illusions of the 
oppressed is a similarly convenient mistake.  Firstly, we get the satisfaction that goes 
with seeing ourselves as coming to the aid of the unenlightened, and as doing so in 
                                                 
35 Elster (1986), p.168.   
36 See Greenwald (2013). 
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an enlightened and sensitive enough way as to acknowledge that their un-
enlightenment is excusable and understandable.  Secondly, it allows ‘us’ (i.e. the 
philosophers or other members of the intellectual elite) to forget that ideological 
distortion is our problem too.  This effectively throws out the uncomfortable insight 
of certain later theorists of ideology, most notably critical theorists, that our thought 
must strive above all to be ‘reflexive’ – that is, to be relentlessly conscious of its own 
origins and social functions.   
 
Thirdly and finally, by setting up the theory of ideology as an attempt at a ‘solution’ 
to such a triumphant non-problem, we leave the theory wide open to uncharitable 
dismissal.  After having thrown it out for failing to be what it is not, the way is left 
clear for other, less threatening, less political concepts to fill the void.  Rosen’s 
performance is a perfect illustration.  He gives the impression that there was this 
puzzle, which philosophers were scratching their heads over, and then some of them 
came up with the theory of ideology in order to solve that puzzle.  That solution 
can’t work, he adds – but never fear, because there’s always the ‘co-ordination 
problem’ (among other things)!37  But that structure gives a completely misleading 
impression of the theory of ideology.  That theory is not offered in response to a pre-
existing puzzle which is pinpointed by ‘Reich’s Question’ – part of the reason for 
that is that the question isn’t much of a puzzle to begin with, and another part of the 
reason is that, as Rosen says, the question may be answered in many other ways.  
Having misconstrued its remit, Rosen can now declare the theory of ideology 
redundant, making way for more widely palatable replacements: not just the ‘co-
ordination problem’, but the familiar categories of ‘wishful thinking’ and ‘adaptive 
preferences’ (or ‘sour grapes’, in acknowledgement of Elster).38 
 
This strikes me a local instance of a more general tendency in the direction of the ‘de-
politicisation’ of political philosophy.  Everyone can accept the idea that sometimes 
humans engage in wishful thinking, or that sometimes they will try to save 
themselves frustration by adjusting their desires to fit the limited possibilities open 
to them.  My worry is not that these concepts don’t correspond to real phenomena – 
of course they do – but that they cannot illuminate and account for everything that 
the more controversial notion of ideology purports to explain.  And furthermore, 
                                                 
37 Rosen does not pretend that the ‘co-ordination problem’ alone can provide a full answer to ‘Reich’s 
Question’, but supplements this with an appeal to non-ideological false consciousness – as I’ll explain 
shortly.  
38 See Elster (1983) and, for the notion of ‘wishful thinking’ only, Geuss (2008; 2010). 
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they tend to encourage the thought – one laden with conservative potential – that 
both false consciousness and the oppressive social orders that it sometimes helps to 
sustain are due to the flawed cognitive and emotional apparatus of the human 
individual, a case of universal, unalterable human frailty.   
 
*** 
 
It is one thing to reject the idea that the theory of ideology is to be understood as an 
answer to something like ‘Reich’s Question’.  It is harder to say, more positively, 
what it is for.  There is probably no single or simple answer to that, especially when 
we remember that – as Rosen rightly acknowledges – what we’re concerned with is 
not a single or simple theory, and arguably not strictly a ‘theory’ at all.  But if 
pushed, we might say that the notion of ideology is put forward as part of an 
attempt to account for the phenomena to do with human ideas, patterns discernible 
in the formation and change of human ideas across different social and historical 
contexts, phenomena ranging from a colleague’s refusal to accept some conclusion, 
when the evidence is of the sort which he or she usually regards as completely 
persuasive, to the fact that it took as long as it did for British women to gain equal 
voting rights with men.  There is no particular puzzle to which the theory is offered as a 
solution – although there may well be all sorts of otherwise puzzling phenomena, 
such as the two examples just given, which it may claim to help us understand.  To 
think otherwise is, I think, to fall in line with a tendency which deserves to be 
viewed with great suspicion: a tendency for analytic philosophers in particular to see 
themselves as confronting a landscape composed of fixed, pre-given ‘problems’, 
waiting for solutions, so that for any given piece of philosophising there must be 
some determinate problem which is its object.  The theory of ideology is not like that, 
any more than Marx’s theory of history more broadly is like that.  It is, rather, a 
general account of how ideal phenomena work, and in particular, what relationship 
they bear to material phenomena: it says that the former are, to a large extent, 
explicable in terms of the function they have for a part of the latter, namely, the 
function of serving certain interests.  A theory of ideology is, therefore, crucially 
bound up with a theory of history – the connections between Marx’s theory of history 
and his notion of ideology are particularly clear (or rather, it is particularly clear that 
the connections are close).   
 
A theory of ideology is, furthermore, bound up with a form of criticism, sometimes 
termed ‘ideology critique’ (or Ideologiekritik): forms of thought may be criticised by 
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being explained as forms of ideology, i.e. in terms of their tendency to promote 
certain interests.  If we were to insist on looking for a puzzle for the theory of 
ideology to solve, we could point to the ‘problem’ of finding universal, authoritative 
standards by which to criticise forms of thought.  If we are unconvinced of their 
existence (or at any rate, of our ability to access them), one response is to reconceive 
criticism as a project of unmasking ideological functions – or, as emphasised by the 
associated tradition of ‘internal’ criticism, a project of unmasking internal 
contradictions within forms of thought.  That, in my view, would at least have the 
advantage that the ‘problem’, in relation to which the theory of ideology is to be 
understood, is actually a problem.   
 
Better still, perhaps, would be to mount some resistance to the trend noted above, 
which pins the problem of false consciousness on the more oppressed, poorer 
majority in society.  Philosophers could start by taking a look at themselves.  
Accounting for the uneducated working-class Tory voter is one thing.  Trying to 
make sense of what goes on inside the heads of self-styled ‘liberal’ or ‘left-leaning’ 
members of the intelligentsia is quite another.  The superior average levels of 
education of the privileged in society, not to mention their greater amounts of leisure 
or professional opportunity for contemplation, might be thought to render the 
ideological false consciousness manifested by members of social elites more 
mysterious, on balance – at least in some instances – than that of the members of 
oppressed groups.  Never mind ‘Reich’s Question’, then.  I can suggest another 
question –‘Finlayson’s question’, if we must play that game: Why do highly 
educated, intelligent people, who have plenty of opportunity to reflect and who are 
even paid for doing so, who are often apparently sincere in their desire to do more 
than simply contribute eloquent ways of rationalising and reinforcing their own and 
their co-travellers’ privilege (and who even claim to be, instead, champions of the 
oppressed – or in any case, of ‘truth’ or ‘reason’), fail so spectacularly to live up to 
their own self-conception? 
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